The U.S. Trade Control Legal System and Chinese Enterprises' Responses

Yujun  Cong

doi:10.54691/mkrgz260

Authors

Yujun Cong

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.54691/mkrgz260

Keywords:

Victimization prevention; law enforcement strategies; judicial logic; corporate compliance.

Abstract

Against the backdrop of warming China-U.S. relations, understanding the U.S. export control legal system remains crucial for China's legislation and enterprises engaged in cross-border trade. Complying with U.S. export administration regulations is the most basic bottom line for enterprises. This paper focuses on enterprises, taking the ZTE and Huawei cases as typical examples to explore the law enforcement strategies and judicial logic of the U.S. government. Concealment and deception are not the best strategies to respond to investigations. Enterprise executives should be cautious about traveling to sensitive regions and carrying documents, which can reduce the risk of sanctions against enterprises and their executives. Developing special compliance programs based on their own business characteristics has become an inevitable trend in enterprise management and a key to enhancing their competitiveness on the international stage.

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