Analysis of Manchester United Club's Development from the Perspective of New Institutional Economics

Abstract

This paper, from the perspective of new institutional economics, provides an in-depth analysis of the development trajectory and challenges faced by Manchester United Football Club. By employing multiple theoretical frameworks, including transaction cost theory, contract theory, property rights theory, and enterprise institutional theory, the study examines issues such as equity transactions, managerial contract management, broadcast revenue distribution, and club governance structure at Manchester United. The research reveals that the high service fees incurred during equity transactions reflect ambiguities in the definition of property rights, while the frequent turnover of head coaches highlights the limitations of incomplete contract mechanisms. Additionally, the distribution of broadcast revenue in the English Premier League is closely tied to Manchester United's league standings, underscoring the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms. The paper also points out that while the clarification of property rights at the institutional level has provided significant support for the club's market-oriented operations, issues such as property rights confusion and the unreasonable allocation of transaction costs persist in practice. Finally, the paper proposes future research directions, recommending a stronger integration of theory and practice, deeper quantitative analysis, an expansion of case study scope, and a focus on the dynamic processes of institutional change. These suggestions aim to offer more robust theoretical support and practical guidance for the development of enterprises in the sports industry.