How Leadership Transition Accountability Mechanisms Drive Environmental Governance Outcomes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54691/a7799m65Keywords:
Leadership Transition Accountability Mechanism, Environmental Governance, Urban Pollution, Difference-in-Differences (DID) Method.Abstract
This study investigates the impact of China’s “Audit of Outgoing Officials’ Natural Resource Asset Management” policy on urban environmental pollution. Utilizing a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model and panel data from 281 cities between 2011 and 2020, we find that the policy significantly reduces pollution. The mechanism analysis reveals that this reduction is primarily achieved through increased environmental penalties, while the effect of environmental aid is not significant. Additionally, heterogeneity analysis shows that the policy’s effectiveness varies with local industrial structure and population density, being more pronounced in cities with advanced industrial structures or lower population density. This research provides valuable insights into the role of government auditing in environmental governance and offers recommendations for optimizing policy design and implementation to maximize its environmental benefits and promote sustainable development.
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